I like the multiplayer mode. Years ago, I thought about a project called "Final Answer," where people would pool funds to receive high-quality answers to hard questions. So, e.g., I want to know if eating eggs is healthy, but I don't want to go through 20 papers to evaluate what's real, so we pool funds with other Internet friends to hire a biology Ph.D. to do that work for us and share the results as a public good. I can imagine that in crypto, pooling funds with other investors to get a shill-free risk analysis of EigenLayer or other protocols might be useful.
@macbudkowski that's the exact use case we're trying to solve with v2! Get these messy, subjective, incentivization problems 100% onchain in a manner that is very hard to game. Would love to test it out for this use case if you can think of a simple bounty we can rally people behind that will be sufficiently subjective (and happy to provide funds to the experiment, of course).
just to compare withdrawals, the Nouner forking (https://mirror.xyz/verbsteam.eth/iN0FKOn_oYVBzlJkwPwK2mhzaeL8K2-W80u82F7fHj8) has an escrow period, then proceed into a forking period. here's an interesting part of that forking period: > During this period original DAO proposals can't be executed, to prevent race conditions between the forking flow and any malicious proposals... New DAOs are deployed with vanilla ragequit in place, allowing any token holder to quit on their own at any time. Otherwise it's possible for a new DAO majority to collude to hurt a minority, and the minority wouldn't have any last resort if they can't reach the forking threshold; furthermore bullies/attackers can recursively chase minorities into fork DAOs in an undesired attrition war. with MolochDAO (https://moloch.daohaus.fun/features/ragequit), the free exit is a bit stricter: > There are a few key points to consider when it comes to the "right to exit" in DAOs: The right to exit should not only be clearly defined in the DAO's governing documents, it should be part of the core protocol and smart contracts. Members should have the ability to exit the DAO at any time, for any reason. There should be no penalties or repercussions for exiting the DAO. Members should be able to easily and quickly exit the DAO if they so choose. I'm generally interested in bounties, and multiplayer versions make more things more viable. Let a thousand experiments bloom. But just like the dynamics of pre-Shanghai Ethereum, I might be hesitant to deposit if the majority rule can be exploited plutocratically. the 48-hour period does seem pretty reasonable and is a backstop to this type of exploit. again, it's a risk tradeoff that everyone will have to determine for themselves.
Hey @kaspotz.eth, so one question I'd like to get answered is: "How to set up your staking portfolio if you are a person who wants to minimize risk and doesn't want to do solo staking? Let's assume the amount to stake is 20 ETH."